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CHAPTER 12 
The Shea Act 
ROBERT CONDLIN 
§12.1. Introduction. Perhaps the most unusual bill to be enacted 
into law during the 1970 session of the Massachusetts legislature was 
House Bill 5165, now Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1970. Named the 
Shea Act after its sponsor,l the statute purports to define the rights of 
inhabitants of the Commonwealth inducted or serving in the military 
forces of the United States.2 Passed in the context of continuing criti-
cism of the United States military involvement in Vietnam, the Shea 
Act could not help but be a political event of some significance.3 
The statute has been characterized in varying ways: (I) an attempt 
at interposition;4 (2) an attempt to overrule the. case of Massachusetts 
RoBERT CoNDLIN is a member of the Massachusetts Bar, 
§12.1. 1 House Bill 5165 was sponsored by Representative H. James Shea of 
Newton, now deceased,, 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 174, The Massachusetts statute, while unusual, is not unparal-
leled. A New York statute enacted in 1783 provides: "No citizen of this state 
can be constrained to arm himself, or to go out of this state, or to find soldiers or 
men of arms, either horsemen or footmen, without the grant and assent of the 
people of this state, by their representatives in senate and assembly, except in 
the cases specially provided for by the constitution of the United States." N.Y. 
Civ. Rights Law §5 (McKinney 1948). This and other such statutes were designed 
to protect individuals serving in the militias of the fledgling American states. As 
long as a militia was allowed to operate within the boundaries of only its respective 
state, it was under the control of governmental leaders who were subject to close 
elettoral check. This safeguard was not present when the distant voice of the 
Federal Government could decide, without restriction, whom, when and where to 
fight. See Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understand-
ing, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1493 (1969). The New York statute was unsuccessfully asserted 
in the cases of Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), and Orlando v. Laird, 
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), as the alleged source of the substantive right to 
enjoin the plaintiffs' participation in the Vietnam War because that war had not 
been constitutionally authorized. 
3 The first history of the political processes leading to the passage of the Shea 
Act is The People v. Presidential War (Wells and Wilhelm eds. 1970), which also 
describes many of the political ramifications of the statute. 
4 The classic formulation of the interposition doctrine, found in Bush v. Or-
leans Parish School Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E.D. La. 1960), a!f'd, 364 U.S. 500 
(1960), defines interposition as "an amorphous concept based on the proposition 
that the United States is a compact of states, any one of which may interpose 
its sovereignty against the enforcement within its borders , of any decision of the 
Supreme Court or act of Congress, irrespective of the fact that the constitutionality 
of the act has been established by decision of the Supreme Court." 188 F. Supp. 
at 922.. · 
1
Condlin: Chapter 12: The Shea Act
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
306 1970 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §12.1 
v. Mel!on;5 or (3) an attempt to usurp the authority of the Federal 
Government to regulate and to direct the operation of the military 
forces of the United States. While each of these characterizations 
contains a grain of truth, and sometimes more, no one by itself ade-
quately explains the enactment of Chapter 17 4. This SuRVEY chapter 
will attempt such an explanation, first, by construing Chapter 17 4 so 
as to save its constitutionality; second, by examining this construction 
to determine whether or not it is reasonable, and therefore per-
missible; and third, by examining the statute and the cases brought 
under its mandate by the Massachusetts attorney general6 to determine 
For a concise history of the attempt by several southern states to circumvent the 
desegregation decisions of the United States Supreme Court by interposition, and 
the judicial reaction to it, see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I (1958). 
5 262 U.S. 447 (1923). This case is often cited for the proposition that a state 
cannot act as parens patriae in behalf of its citizens for purposes of suing the 
Federal Government. The language of the Mellon decision cited in support of 
this proposition is as follows: "We come next to consider whether the suit may be 
maintained by the State as representative of its citizens. To this the answer is not 
doubtful. We need not go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by 
suit to protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional 
acts of Congress; but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here .... 
[T]he citizens of Massachusetts are also citizens of the· United Stat.es. It cannot be 
conceded that a State, as parens patriae, may institute judicial proceedings to 
protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the statutes thereof. 
While the State, under some circumstances, may sue in that capacity for the pro-
tection of its citizens (Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241), it i:; no part of its 
duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal 
Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which repre-
sents them as parens patriae, when such representation becomes appropriate; and 
to the former, and not to the latter, they must look for such protective measures 
as flow from that status." ld. at 485-486. 
6 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Massachusetts v. Laird, Civ. No. 
71-419 (D. Mass., filed Feb. 12, 1971). These cases will not be discussed per se. 
Except for the admittedly unusual argument in support of the Commonwealth's 
standing to sue, they raise only the issue of the constitutionality of the Vietnam 
War. That issue has been analyzed in exhaustive detail by several highly qualified 
commentators. A partial listing of such commentators follows: D'Amato, The Mas-
sachusetts Antiwar Bill, 42 N.Y.S.B.J. 639 (Nov. 1970); Faulkner, The War in 
Vietnam: Is It Constitutional?, 56 Geo. L.J. ll32 (1968); Hull and Novograd, Law 
and Vietnam (1968); Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doc-
trine, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 (1968); Kurland, The Impotence of Reticence, 1968 
Duke L.J. 619 (1968); Legality of United States Participation in the Viet Nam 
Conflict: A Symposium, 75 Yale L.J. 1084 (1966); Malawar, The Vietnam War 
Under the Constitution: Legal Issues Involved in the United States Military In-
volvement in Vietnam, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 205 (1969); Moore, The National Execu-
tive and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad, 21 Nav. War Coli. Rev. 28 (1969); 
Note, Congress, the President, and the Power to COmmit Forces to Combat, 81 
Harv. L. Rev. 1771 (1968); Note, The President, the Congress, and the Power to 
Declare War, 16 Kan. L. Rev. 82 (1967); Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam 
Conflict, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 281 (1966); M. Pusey, The Way We Go to War (1969); 
Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 
Va. L. Rev. 1243 (1970); R. Russell, The United States Congress and the Power 
to Use Military Force Abroad, Apr. 15, 1967 (unpublished thesis in Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy Library, Tufts University); Schwartz and McCor-
2
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1970 [1970], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1970/iss1/15
§12.2 THE SHEA ACT 307 
whether there is, in fact, a necessary relationship. This chapter will 
conclude by suggesting that although the Massachusetts statute may 
be constitutional and therefore of some legal significance, its his-
torical importance is likely to be political rather than legal. 
§12.2. Legislative directive to sue. The title of Chapter 174 of 
the Acts of 1970 states that the chapter is an act defining the "Rights 
of Inhabitants [of the Commonwealth] Inducted or Serving in Mili-
tary Forces of the United States."t At first blush, the chapter appears 
to attempt interposition by placing limits on the participation of 
Massachusetts inhabitants in armed hostilities while serving in the 
military forces of the United States. Section I states that no inhabitant 
of Massachusetts "shall be required to serve" in hostilities not of the 
type thereafter set out, and Section 2 provides specific remedies for 
the violation of any of the rights granted "under section one." This 
language is affirmative and unambiguous, and under other circum-
stances would have to be considered an attempt to create new sub-
mack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in 
Vietnam, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 10!13 (1968); Special Issue: United States Intervention in 
Cambodia: Legal Analyses of the Event and its Domestic Repercussions, 50 B.U.L. 
Rev. (1970); Standard, United States Intervention in Vietnam Is Not Legal, 52 
A.B.A.]. 627 (1966); Tigar, Judicial Power, The "Political Question Doctrine", and 
Foreign Relations, 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 1135 (1970); Velvel, The War in Viet Nam: 
Unconstitutional, Justiciable, and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 Kan. L. Rev. 
449 (1968); Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution 
(1968). . 
§12.2. 1 Acts of 1970, c. 174. The body of the statute provides: 
"SECTION 1. No inhabitant of the commonwealth inducted or serving in the mili-
tary forces of the United States shall be required to serve outside the territorial 
limits of the United States in the conduct of armed hostilities not an emergency 
and not otherwise authorized in the powers granted to the President of the United 
States in Article 2, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States designating 
the President as the Commander-in-Chief, unless such hostilities were initially 
authorized or subsequently ratified by a congressional declaration of war ac-
cording to the constitutionally established procedures in Article I, Section 8, of 
the Constitution of the United States. 
·"SEcriON 2. The attorney general shall, in the name and on behalf of the com-
monwealth and on behalf of any inhabitants thereof who are required to serve in 
the armed forces of the United States in violation of section one of this act, bring 
an appropriate action in the Supreme Court of the United States as the court 
having original jurisdiction thereof under clause two of section 2 of Article III 
of the Constitution of the United States to defend and enforce the rights of such 
inhabitants and of the commonwealth under section one; but if it shall be finally 
determined that such action is not one of which the Supreme Court of the 
United States has original jurisdiction, then he shall bring another such action 
in an appropriate inferior federal court. Any inhabitant of the commonwealth 
who is required to serve in the armed forces of the United States in violation of 
section one of this act may notify the attorney general thereof, and all such in-
habitants so notifying the attorney general shall be joined as parties in such action. 
If such action shall be commenced hereunder in an inferior federal court, the at-
torney general shall take all steps necessary and within his power to obtain favor-
able action thereon, including a decision by the Supreme Court of the United 
States." 
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stantive rights. However, this is not necessarily so in the: present ci:l:-
cumstances., 
Article I, Section 8, and Article II, Sections 1-3, of the Constitution 
of the United States vest in Congress and the Executive .. and not in 
the, states, sole control of the military forces of the United States.2 
This control is exclusive and extenps tQ all facets of the operation of 
a military force, including the right to order it into. and direct it in 
battle.s If Chapter 174, and particularly Section 1 of that act,, is read 
literally, it would be in conflict with these constitutional provisions 
2 Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 26·27 (1942); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
299 u.s. 304, 317-322 (1936). 
3 U.S. Const. art. I, '§8, in relevant parts, provides: "The Congress shall have 
Power To ... provide for the common Defence arid general 'Welfare of the 
United States; 
"[Cl. 10]. To define and, punish Piracies and Felonies committ(d on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
'"[Cl. 11] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; 
"[Cl. 12] To raise llnd support Armies, but rio.Appropriation of Money to that 
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
"[Cl. 13] To provide and maintain a Navy; 
"[Cl. 14] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation oE the land. ap,d 
naval Forces; 
"[Cl. 15]. To prov~de for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;, 
"[Cl. 16] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and 
for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States, reserving tp the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the 
Authority of. training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by, Con-
gress; 
"[Cl. 17.] To exercise exclusive Legi,slation ..• over all Placet~ purchased by, the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same. shall be, Jor the Erection 
of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yar!ls, and, other needful Blllildings;- And 
"[Cl. 18] To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and. all other Powers vested by, this. Consti-
tution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof." 
U.S. Const., art. II, §1, cl. 1,. in relevant part,. provides: "The (Xecutive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United. States, of A!Jlerica." 
U.S. Const. art. I1,,§2,.cl. 1, in rdevant part,.provides.: "The Prc:$jdent shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and. Navy of the United States and of th~ Militia 
of the several States, when called into the actt~al Seryice of the Unit·ed States .... :' 
U.S. Const. art. II, §3, cl. l, in relevant part, provides: "He [the President] shall 
take Care that. the Laws befaithfully.execu~ed, and shall Ca;mmission all the Officers 
of the Unite!! States." 
See. also Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S .. 579, 642 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 (1866); Prize 
Cases, 67 U.S .. (2 Black) 635, 668. (1862); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 
(1801); Berdahl, War Powers of the ExecuUve in the United States, 79 (19~1); 
Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means Today 61 (lOth ed .. 1948); Corwin, 
The Presi!Jent: Office and Powers 180 (4th ed. 1957); 1 Farrand, The Records of 
the Federat Convention of 1787, at 316, 318,-319 (19ll); 2 Story, Commentaries 01;1 
the Cons~itution of the United States 92-93 (gth. ed .. 1,891); Wilson, State. House 
Speech, in Mason, Free Government in the Making 265 (3d ed. Hl65). , 
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and, as such, null and void. Necessity being the mother of invention, 
the supporters of Chapter 174 argue, therefore, that their act was not 
intended to create new statutory restrictions on the participation of 
Massachusetts inhabitants in military service because such action was 
impossible.4 They premise their argument upon the well-established 
principle of. statutory construction that, if necessary, a statute must 
be construed in such a fashion as to save its constitutionality.5 Before 
examining this suggested 'construction of Chapter 174, however, one 
must be aware of another constitutional limitation on the legislative 
power of the Commonwealth also relevant to ascertain what the 
chapter intended to do. 
In granting the Federal Government the authority to regulate and 
direct the military of the United States, the framers of the Constitu-
tion were careful to provide for safeguards to protect individual citi-
zens against the abuse of this authority. For example, while the 
Executive was given unilateral authority to wage some armed hos-
tilities, only the Congress was allowed to declare a war.6 Furthermore, 
while the Executive was given exclusive control over where and when 
the military was to be employed, it was required to seek biennial 
funding of such deployment from the Congress. 7 
These and other such limitations on the use of the military by a 
41t has been argued that Massachusetts could and did, by the passage of Chapter 
174, create new substantive rights for its citizens. The argument, briefly stated, is 
this: the Federal Government has no power to conscript. See Friedman, Conscrip-
tion and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1493 
(1969). Thus, whenever the Federal Government has mobilized large armies it has 
not, as most people think, conscripted men into service. Rather, it has mobilized 
them under U.S. Const. art. I, §8, d. 15, authorizing the national Government to 
call forth the militias of the states. The distinction between a federal army of 
conscripts and a federal army of militiamen is unimportant when a war has been 
declared by Congress, since the prosecution of a war under congressional authdriza-
tion is one of the grounds upon which the militia may be called forth. However, 
when there is no act of Congress authorizing the prosecution of a war, and no 
other ground for the mobilization of the militia, the militias of the several states 
cannot be called forth. Since Massachusetts has constitutional authority to regu-
late the use of its militia, it may pass a statute restricting the disbursement of 
that force. In the absence of any supervening federal legislation, that Massachusetts 
statute would control and would have to be enforced. Since there is no act of Con-
gress authorizing the prosecution of the Vietnam War, and no other constitutional 
ground for calling forth the Massachusetts Militia, Chapter 174 can and does re-
strict the deployment of Massachusetts servicemen to Vietnam. See Brief for 
Lawyers' Committee on Undeclared War as Amicus Curiae at 36-37, Massachusetts 
v. Lail'd, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). Interpreted in this way, Chapter 174 is identical in 
purpose to Section 5 of the Civil Rights Law of New York, and presumably con-
fers the same substantive rights, if any. 
5 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-408 (1909); United 
States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916): United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 
303, 329-330 (1946): Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westing-
house Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 453 (1955). 
6 See note 3 supra. 
7 U.S. Const. art. I, §8, d. 12; U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. I. 
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branch of the Federal Government carry with them the corollary 
right, in individual citizens, to have such limitations observed. The 
boundaries of these limitations andfor rights often overlap, however, 
and must be defined in the context of specific cases. The responsibility 
for such definition has traditionally belonged to the Supreme Court as 
"ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,''S or, on occasion, to the 
Executive and the Congress acting jointly in a sort of "dialectical real-
politik."9 In any event, it is clear that a state of the union has no 
jurisdiction to undertake such a definition. Therefore, the supporters 
of Chapter 174 presumably would say that it cannot, and therefore 
does not, purport to dictate in what circumstances the Constitution 
of the United States would either authorize or prohibit the participa-
tion of Massachusetts citizens in armed hostilities. 
Keeping in mind that Chapter 174 can neither create new rights 
nor define the boundaries of those already provided for in the Con-
stitution, the supporters of the act nonetheless argue that it is capable 
of constitutional construction. They suggest that Section 1 of the 
statute should be construed as a reference to the aforementioned rights 
provided to both the Commonwealth and its inhabitams by Articles 
I and II of the Constitution, and Section 2 as a legislative and guber-
natorial directive to the Commonwealth's attorney general to take 
steps to protect the rights referred to in Section 1,1° In other words, 
the proponents of Chapter 174 read Section l of the act to state: 
No inhabitant of the Commonwealth inducted or serving in 
the military forces of the United States shall be required to serve 
in the conduct of armed hostilities not authorized according to 
the Constitution of the United States. 
The genesis and rationale for this construction of Section l should 
now be obvious. This is not a creation of rights, but a statement of 
pre-existing rights. It is necessary to say a few additional explanatory 
words, however, about the suggested construction of Section 2. 
At first glance, Section 2 appears to state that whenever a Massachu-
setts inhabitant is required to participate in armed hostilities not 
authorized in accordance with the Constitution, the Commonwealth 
itself is harmed and thereby has jurisdiction to redress that harm in 
the Supreme Court, or in some other court of the United States. Once 
again, however, the language of Chapter 174 is misleading. It is clear 
that a state cannot, by legislative fiat, declare itself to be a proper 
party in interest to bring a lawsuit before a court of the United 
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962). 
9 The best explication of this more pragmatic method of ascertaining the limits 
of the war powers is Justice Jackson's famous "twilight zone" concurring opinion 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952). 
10 The source of this legislative and for gubernatorial power to direct the at· 
torney general to sue is G.L., c. 12, §3• See §12.5 infra. 
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States.11 Legal interest sufficient to constitute standing can be held to 
exist only by a court to whom a lawsuit is presented. Therefore, Sec-
tion 2 of Chapter 174 must be construed otherwise if it is to be com-
patible with the Constitution. 
Supporters of Chapter 174 suggest that Section 2 declares, not 
that Massachusetts has standing to bring a legal action, but only that 
upon the occurrence of certain conditions the attorney general of the 
Commonwealth is directed to argue the resultant action. In any law-
suit initiated pursuant to Chapter 174, it is thus contended that the 
attorney general must satisfy the court from evidence and argument 
that Massachusetts is harmed in its capacity as a sovereign state. In 
support of this interpretation, the act's proponents point to the lan-
guage of Section 2, which states that "if it shall be finally determined 
that such action is not one of which th<: Supreme Court of the 
United States has original jurisdiction, then he shall bring another 
such action in an appropriate inferior federal court." It is argued that 
this language indicates that the drafters of Chapter 174 acknowledged 
that they must leave the determination of jurisdiction with the ju-
diciary, to which it constitutionally belongs. 
Construed in this narrower fashion, Chapter 174 is less susceptible to 
constitutional attack on the grounds noted at the outset. It does 
not interpose the sovereignty of the Commonwealth between the 
latter's citizens and any law of the United States. On the contrary, it 
may very well insure that the Massachusetts citizens are afforded the 
full protection of the supreme law of the United States, the Con-
stitution. 
Nor does the act subvert the holding of Massachusetts v. Mellon}2 
but instead specifically recognizes that any action brought by the 
Commonwealth will have to comply with not only the requirements of 
the Mellon decision but with all of the other requirements of standing 
to sue. Finally, construed as a legislative directive to the attorney 
general, Chapter 174 does not usurp the federal authority to regulate 
the military forces of the United States, but rather acknowledges that 
authority to be supreme, answerable only to the Constitution. If 
Chapter 174 means what its proponents suggest that it does, then there 
is little doubt that it is constitutional. Before reaching such a con-
clusion, however, a closer look at the language of the act is warranted. 
§12.3. Section I -reference or definition? Section I of the Shea 
Act lists the various sections of ·the Constitution under which the 
Federal Government may initiate armed hostilities, suggesting by 
implication that all constitutional articles, clauses, and sections not 
listed cannot so authorize. If, however, it was intended that Section I 
be referential rather than definitive, a specific listing of all the con-
stitutional sources of the war powers would have been unnecessary. A 
11 See Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Muskrat v. United States, 219 
u.s. 346 (19ll ). 
12 262 U.S. 447 (1923); see §12.1 supra, n.5. 
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general statement would have sufficed. Specificity is esse][),tial only if 
the section was intended as a definition andjor interpretation of the 
constitutional provisions in question. 
It is possible, of course, that the Massachusetts legislature intended 
to both define and refer to the war power rights at the same time. A 
definition which is both exhaustive and accurate can also serve as a 
specific or precise reference. There are dangers in trying to refer with 
such absolute precision,·however, and Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1970 
may not have avoided them. 
For example, Section !limits the application of Chapter 174 to only 
those hostilities which occur "outside the territorial limits of the 
United States." By implication, then, the statute declares that a Massa-
chusetts inhabitant has no constitutional right to avoid armed hos-. 
tilities, no matter how commenced, inside those territorial limits. As 
a proposition of constitutional law the foregoing is almost certainly 
erroneous. The limitations placed upon the coordinate branches of 
the Federal Government by the war power clauses of the Constitution 
apply to intraterritorial as well as to extr~territorial wars. Nowhere was 
the foregoing more evident than during the American Civil War, when 
President Lincoln's entry into and conduct of the war were both 
subjected to constitutional scrutiny.1 By implying that a Massachusetts 
inhabitant must participate in any intraterritorial hostilities, no 
matter how commenced, Chapter 174 may enlarge upon the war-mak-
ing powers of the Federal Government and simultaneously restrict the 
constitutional right of Massachusetts citizens. 
Section 1 also exempts from its purview hostilities which are "emer-
gencies" or "otherwise authorized" by the Commander-in-Chief clause 
of the constitution.2 If by this language Chapter 174 meant to state 
that the sourc~ of all executive authority to commence armed hostili-
ties is Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution, which designates the 
President as Commander-in-Chief, it is wrong. The Conu:nander-in-
Chief clause has been rather uniformly defined to do no more than to 
place the Executive at the apex of the pyramid of military command, 
making hi:nl ''first general and admiral."3 While the clause gives the 
President a11t4ority to direct and command the military of the United 
States once the latter has been ptherwise committed to battle,4 it 
§12.3. 1 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 
Black) 635 (1862); Ex parte Merryman, 17 F, Cas, 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861). 
2 U.S. Const. art. II, §2, cl. I. 
3 The Federalist No. 69, at 430 (H. Lodge ed, 1888) (A. Hamilton); Ware v. 
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 158, 215-216 (1'796) (Iredell, J.); Madsen '· Kinsella, 93 F. 
Supp. 319, 323 (S.D.W. Va. 1950), afj'd, 843 U.S. 341 (1952). 
4 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942); see also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 
160, 167 (1948); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 18 (1866);: Prize Cases, 67 
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862); Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 634, 647 (1850); 
R. Russell, The United. States Congress and the Power to US<: Military Force 
Abroad 27-28, 63, Apr. 15, 1967 (unpublished thesis in the Fletcher Scltoo1 of Law 
and Diplomacy Library, Tufts University). 
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has never been held to include the power to initiate the conduct of 
such hostilities. 
If, on the other hand, this language meant to state that the source 
of executive authority to commence armed hostilities is contained 
either within the Commander-in-Chief clause or within independent 
"emergency"5 war powers of the President, or both, it is less susceptible 
to constitutional attack. There is no doubt that the executive has 
constitutional power to deal with military emergencies independent of 
the Commander-in-Chief clause.6 It is not at all clear, however, that 
this power is limited to only emergency situations.7 By using the word 
5 Chapter 174 does not define the word emergency. Therefore it is assumed that 
the drafters of the statute intended the word to be used in its commonly accepted 
meaning of "an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state 
that calls for immediate action." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 
741 (1966). It may later become necessary, in attempting to construe Chapter 174 
constitutionally, to enlarge slightly upon this definition. 
6 The debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicate that the grant 
to the Congress in art. I, §8, d. ll, of the power "to declare war" also included 
a grant of emergency war powers to the Executive. 
At the convention, the original draft by the Committee of Detail gave the Con-
gress the power "[t]o make war," Some delegates believed that this wording of 
the clause would prevent the President from responding to an emergency situation 
before the Congress could assemble and act. The debates reveal that declare was 
substituted for make to insure that the President could act in emergency situa-
tions until such time as the Congress could convene to consider the matter. Madi-
son, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, at 341, 418-419 (Hunt and 
Scott eds. 1920). See also 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, at 318-319 (19ll); 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States, 92-93 (5th ed. 1891); 54 Dept. State Bull. 474, 484 (1966). It is also possible, 
though as yet unclear, that the "chief executive" and "take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed" clauses of the Constitution (Art. II, §1, cl. I; Art. II, §3, cl. I) 
confer limited war powers on the President. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 26 
(1942). 
7 The best indicator of the limits of presidential power to commit American 
military forces abroad is the history of its use. One commentator has classified all 
uses of the war power according to the following formula: 
"(1) Lives and property refers to landings conducted for the purpose of pro-
tecting American lives and property in foreign nations during periods of internal 
turmoil, consistent with the international legal right to protect lives and property 
and not involving any known purpose of political interference in the affairs of 
the foreign country. 
"(2) Disavowed refers to military action taken by a military officer or other 
government official acting without or contrary to his instructions, when such ac-
tions were later specifically disavowed by the United States government. 
"(3) Punitive refers to military expeditions which punished weakly organized 
societies for crimes which ordinarily would have called for diplomatic protest, but 
due to the nature of the societies, force was a customary way to deal with them. 
"(4) Reprisal refers to military reprisals taken against a nation for military 
offenses against the United States or its citizens, when such reprisals did not have 
congressional authorization. 
"(5) Crime refers to actions taken to suppress an international crime as com-
monly recognized, such as piracy, the slave trade, or pelagic sealing. The reference 
is used regardless of whether Congress specifically a'Uthorized the action, since 
9
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emergency, Chapter 174 may have unnecessarily limited itself and 
made a constitutional construction of the statute impossible. 
The Shea Act also exempts any hostilities "initially authorized or 
subsequently ratified by a congressional declaration of war"s according 
to "the constitutionally established procedures in Article I, Section 8, 
of the Constitution of the United States."9 This exemption is question-
able not so much for its lack of accuracy as for its needless specificity. 
the President is assumed to possess general authority in this area to use military 
force. 
"(6) Hot pursuit refers to military invasion of the territory of a foreign nation 
in the pursuit of criminals or other public enemies regardless of whether the 
foreign nation whose territory is invaded agrees to or protests the invasion. 
"(7) Treaty refers to uses of force under specific terms of a treaty agreement 
with a foreign nation. 
"(8) Authorized refers to uses of force approved by Congress through legislative 
action. 
"(9) Insignificant is self-explanatory." 
Of these categories, only numbers one, two (to a limited extent), six, and seven 
(to a limited extent) involve widespread presidential use of foro~ for the pur-
pose of dealing with emergencies. The remaining categories, with the obvious 
exception of number eight, consist of presidential commitment of troops in non-
emergency situations. A statistical analysis of this compilation shows that a sig-
nificant percentage of past examples of presidential use of militar}' force involved 
nonemergency situations. Presumably, then, the executive has power to initiate 
military hostilities in nonemergency situations. R. Russell, note 4 supra, at 485-
496. But see a rejection of a similar argument in Youngstown Shfet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp 569, 575 (D.D.C. 1952). 
On at least one of the nonemergency occasions referred to in the aforementioned 
compilation (the reprisal bombardment of Greytown, Nicaragua, in I854), the 
power of the President to take such action was upheld by a Justice of the Supreme 
Court sitting on circuit. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (No. 4187) (S.D.N.Y. 
1852). For a critical analysis of the Greytown incident, see Wormuth, The Viet-
nam War: The President Versus the Constitution 22-24, 31-32 (1968). 
sA common misconception is that a declaration of war must be a formal docu-
ment entitled "Declaration of War." Such has never been the case. The legislative 
notion of a declaration of war has been a flexible one, susceptible of different 
interpretations depending upon the circumstances in which it arose. Perhaps the 
best example of a "declaration" which does not look like a "declaration" is the set 
of statutes which combined to involve this nation in -a naval war with France in 
1798-I801. See I Stat. 547 (Mar. 27,1798); 1 Stat. 549 (Apr. 7, 1798); 1 Stat. 552 (Apr. 
27, I798); 1 Stat. 553 (Apr. 27, 1798); I Stat. 554 (May 3, 1798); 1 Stat. 555 (May 4, 
I798); 1 Stat. 556 (May 4, 1798); 1 Stat. 558 (May 28, 1798); 1 Stat. 565 (June I3, 
1798); 1 Stat. 569 (June 22, 1798); 1 Stat. 572, extended 2 Stat. 39 (Apr. 22, 1800); 
1 Stat. 576 (July 6, 1798); 1 Stat. 578 (July 7, 1798); 1 Stat. 594 (Jillly 11, 1798); 1 
Stat. 595 (July 11, 1798); 1 Stat. 604 (July 16, 1798); 1 Stat. 61!1 (Feb. 9, 1799); I Stat. 
621 (Feb. 25, I799); 1 Stat. 709 (Mar. 2, 1799); 1 Stat. 729 (Mar. 2, 1799). See also 
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); Bas v. Tingey, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 
(1800). 
9 Acts of 1970, c. 174. By referring to Article I, Section 8, generally, rather than 
specifically to the "declare war" clause, Chapter 174 avoided the constitutional 
pitfall of defining too narrowly the congressional power to authorize war. It is 
arguable that Congress can declare war, not only expressly by formal statement 
pursuant to art. I, §8, d. 11, but also implicitly by raising and sup}iorting an army 
and navy pursuant to art. I, §8, cls. 12-13, or by Calling forth the militia pursuant 
to art. I, §8, cls. 15-I6. See §12.2 ·supra, note 3. 
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By designating Article I, Section 8, as the sole repository of congres-
sional war power, Chapter 174 has foreclosed all unorthodox or un-
usual congressional ratification of war under other sections of the 
Constitution.10 While there may never have been or may never be 
such unorthodox or unusual ratification, it strikes one as being the 
role of the Supreme Court and not the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts to foreclose such a possibility. 
Taken as a whole, Section I appears to be sound in theory, but less 
so in execution. The avowed purpose of the section, to refer to 
specific independent constitutional rights, is a simple one capable of 
simple expression. The Massachusetts legislature, by cluttering this 
expression with unneeded specificity, has added to the already sub-
stantial burden of the supporters of Chapter 174. 
§12.4. Section 2- clarity of purpose. Whether Section 1 of the 
Shea Act stands or falls, the constitutional rights to which it alludes 
do exist and will continue to do so. Therefore, if Section 2 is a 
legislative directive to the Commonwealth's attorney general to sue 
to protect those rights, Chapter 174 of the Acts of 1970 is not only 
viable but important.1 This section is both contradictory and am-
biguous, however, and thus presents problems of statutory construc-
tion equal to those presented by Section I, if not greater. 
The first problem occurs in the first sentence of the Section 2, where 
the attorney general is directed to bring "an appropriate action in 
the Supreme Court of the United States" "in the name and on behalf 
of the commonwealth and on behalf of any inhabitants thereof."2 
While the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to hear suits in 
which states are plaintiffs,3 its jurisdiction over suits by individuals is 
10 Ratification, which is approval after the fact, should be distinguished from 
authorization, which either precedes or is contemporaneous with the act in ques-
tion. Article I, §8, d. ll, may very well be the only source of congressional power 
to authorize war, because it is the only clause which provides for congressional 
action prior to or contemporaneous with the outbreak of hostilities. The other 
clauses of Article I, Section 8, which allow Congress to approve of a war im-
plicitly by fighting it, provide for ratification. Congress may, of course, ratify 
what it might have authorized. Swayne & Hoyt Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297, 
301-302 (1937). See also Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 n.24 (1944). 
§12.4. 1 While Chapter 174 does not contain a severability clause, Section 2, 
read as a legislative directive, is by nature separable from Section 1. That being 
the case, it is to be presumed that the legislature would have enacted Section 2 if 
presented alone and intended that, if valid, the section be allowed to stand. See 
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-290 (1924); Krupp v. Building Commr. of 
Newton, 325 Mass. 686, 691 (1950); Commonwealth v. Petranich, 183 Mass. 217, 220 
(1903). 
2 The attorney general is ordered to protect the rights of the Commonwealth 
and its inhabitants existing "under section one." We have seen that Section 1 does 
not create new rights for Massachusetts or its inhabitants, but only refers to pre-
existing rights. If this construction is to be carried throughout Chapter 174, as it 
must, Section 2 must be read as directing the attorney general to protect the con-
stitutional rights of the Commonwealth and its inhabitants referred to in Section I. 
3 U.S. Const. art. III, §2, d. 2; 28 U.S.C. §1251(a)(1), 1251(b)(2)-(3) (1964). 
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very limited4 and does not include any action by or on behalf of a 
Massachusetts serviceman or servicemen.5 Therefore, unless the phrase 
"on behalf of any inhabitants thereof'' can be interpreted to mean: (I) 
without naming such inhabitants; (2) without making them parties to 
the action; (3) without listing the particular ways in which they have 
been harmed; and (4) without asking for specific relief on their be-
half, the legislative directive is self-contradictory.6 
The Section 2 directive is made more confusing by the following 
ambiguous language: "but if it shall be finally determiiJLed that such 
action is not one of which the Supreme Court ... has original juris-
diction, then he [the attorney general] shall bring another such action 
in an appropriate inferior federal court." Because a joint suit by both 
the Commonwealth and "inhabitants thereof" is a jurisdictional im-
possibility, the language quoted could mean that, if the attorney 
general shall "finally determine" that the Supreme Court is not the 
court of original jurisdiction, he shall immediately go to the "appro-
priate inferior federal court." On the other hand, this language may 
mean that the attorney general has no alternative but to ask the 
Supreme Court to make the decision with respect to jurisdiction.7 
4 U.S. Const. art. III, §2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.C. §§125l(a)(2), 125l(b)(l) (1964). The 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over suits brought by individuals is 
limited to those suits brought by or against ambassadors, or other public minis· 
ters of foreign states, ot to which consuls or vice-consuls of foreign states arc 
parties. 
5 It is conceptually possible, though unlikely, that an ambassador or public 
minister of a foreign state could, as a Massachusetts inhabitant and a member of 
the military forces of the United States, bring an original action in the Supreme 
Court of the United States. For that strange event to occur, howe'l'er, there would 
have to be a great deal of cooperation on the part of the foreign state and per· 
haps even a greater amount of carelessness on the part of the Department of 
State. It should also be pointed out that there is no jurisdictional doctrine, in· 
eluding both the doctrines of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction, which would al· 
low individual plaintiffs to be brought into an original action on the jurisdictional 
coattails of the Commonwealth. 
6 It is arguable that this language of Section 2 can be so interpreted. The phrase 
specifies that the suit must be brought in the name as well as on behalf of Mas· 
sachusetts inhabitants. A suit in the name of only the Commonwealth challenging 
the Federal Government's power to conduct the Vietnam War, if successful, would 
be of indirect benefit to and therefore on behalf of Massachusetts inhabitants, 
whether they were parties to the action or not. 
7 The latter conclusion is more likely. The use of the word finally seems to in-
dicate that the legislature intended that the Supreme Court, a more "final" tri-
bunal than the attorney general, decide whethet ot not it has jurisdiction. The 
reference shortly thereafter in the same sentence to ••another" action in an "in-
ferior federal court" also indicates that the legislature envisioned any lower court 
action as being in addition to rather than in lieu of an action in the Supreme Court. 
One thing which the language "finally determined" makes clear, however, is the 
fact that the legislature was aware of and acknowledged the pos11ibility that the 
Commonwealth may not be a proper party in interest to bring a Chapter 174 
litigation. This is strong evidence of the fact that the statute is not a declaration 
of interest, and thereby an unconstitutional attempt to confer jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court. There are additional problems, rooted in the d01:trine of separa-
12
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Given the contradictory and ambiguous nature of the foregoing 
provisions, a court can look behind the plain words of the statute in 
an effort to ascertain its intent.8 While ordinarily of little use in a 
state where most of the legislative process, including all debate, is 
not recorded, this principle may very well rescue Chapter 174. 
Because Chapter 174 was the focus of much public attention, its 
defense before the Joint Judiciary Committee of the Massachusetts 
legislature was taped for television. An attempt is now being made 
to reconstruct from this tape a quasi-official transcript of that hearing. 
While not as much weight as an official legislative record, such a 
document would serve as some evidence of legislative intent. In ad-
dition, some of the legislators who participated in the passage of 
Chapter 174 have expressed their purposes for such action in a book 
about the statute.9 While after the fact and somewhat unusual as a 
source of legislative history, this latter document is nevertheless more 
than has been available to many courts inquiring into legislative in-
tent in the past. 
There is another possibility which should also be considered. The 
problem with which Chapter 174 concerns itself-the need for ad-
herence to the Constitution in the conduct of a war-is a unique one 
with which state legislatures infrequently deal. Presumably, only 
very unusual circumstances could make the consideration of such a 
statute, let alone its passage, a possibility. A court might very well 
take judicial notice of such circumstances and conclude that the 
Massachusetts legislature, in enacting Chapter 174, could have in-
tended only one thing, namely, to direct the Commonwealth's attorney 
general to challenge the constitutionality of the Vietnam War. 
All of these possibilities are no doubt unorthodox and somewhat 
lacking in precedent, but then again, so is the very statute in question. 
On balance, however, it would not seem unreasonable for a court to 
conclude that Section 2, notwithstanding its contradictory and am-
biguous language, was intended to be, and in fact is, an exercise of the 
legislative power to direct the attorney general to sue. 
Two additional aspects of the directive of Section 2, relating to 
tion of powers, which also attach to this legislative directive to sue in the Supreme 
Court. 
8 It is well established that a court can look to the legislative history of a 
statute for the. purpose of ascertaining legislative intent only when the language 
of the statute is ambiguous on its face. Town of Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. 
Comm., 342 Mass. 222, 223, 172 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1961); Boston Consol. Gas Co. 
v. Department of Pub. Utils., 321 Mass. 259, 264-266, 72 N.E.2d 543, 546-547 (1947); 
· City of Worcester v. Quinn, 304 Mass. 276, 281, 23 N.E.2d 463, 465-466 (1939); 
Carlos Ruggles Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth, 261 Mass. 445, 447-448, 158 N.E. 
897, 898 (1927). 
9 The People v. Presidential War (Wells and Wilhelm eds. 1970). See particu-
larly chapters written by State Representatives Jack Backman at 139 and David 
Bartley at 159; State Senators Maurice Donahue at 97 and Joseph Ward at. 181; and 
Judiciary Committee witJiesses.John Wells at 5, Lawrence. Velvel at 63 and Ernest 
Groening at 79. 
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substance rather than form of enactment, also warrant brief considera-
tion. The first is the legislative standard upon which initiation of 
suit by the attorney general is conditioned.10 Under the terms of the 
act, the attorney general may question the constitutionality of only 
those armed hostilities in which Massachusetts inhabitants are com-
pelled to participate. This presumably includes hostilities involving 
as few as one Massachusetts inhabitant. By implication, this precon-
dition to suit also means that an unconstitutional war, fought within 
the borders of the Commonwealth but not involving Massachusetts 
inhabitants, could not be challenged under the act. Given the fore-
going possibilities, the question arises whether the section's standard 
for suit is reasonably related to the statutory purpose of protecting 
the Commonwealth from unconstitutional wars. A court must be able 
to find such a relationship before it can sustain Chapter 174 as a 
proper delegation of legislative power. 
This task may not be as difficult as may at first appear. Certainly it 
is the rare case in which a war, fought within the boundaries of a 
particular state, does not involve the inhabitants of that state. Equally 
rare is the war, no matter where fought, in which only one inhabitant 
of any single state is compelled to participate. It is more likely, and 
the Massachusetts legislature appears reasonable in relying upon this, 
that when one inhabitant of the Commonwealth is required to par-
ticipate in a war, many thousands are. It also appears reasonable for 
the legislature to conclude, although this is a closer question, that the 
compelled participation of thousands of Commonwealth inhabitants 
in an unconstitutional war may harm the state as a sovereign entity. 
The remaining portion of Section 2 which merits brief mention is 
that part which states: "[a]ny inhabitant of the commonwealth ... 
required to serve ... in violation of section one ... may notify the 
attorney general thereof, and all such inhabitants so notifying ... 
shall be joined as parties" in any action to be brought.n This re-
quirement is one of the restrictions imposed by Chapter 174 upon 
litigation commenced by the attorney general under the mandate of 
that act.12 While it is not unusual for one branch of the government 
to direct a coordinate branch to take a designated cours·e of action, it 
10 Because Chapter 174 is an open-ended directive to sue, capable of being 
acted upon whenever enumerated conditions occur, it is a delegati.on of legislative 
power. It is an axiom of administrative law that such a delegation must be ac-
companied by an adequate standard for the exercise of the power delegated. 
Burnham v. Board of Appeals of Gloucester, 3!13 Mass. 114, 118, 128 N.E.2d 772, 
775 (1955); Butler v. Town of East Bridgewater, 330 Mass. 33, 3t5-37, llO N.E.2d 
922, 924-925 (195!1); 1 Davis, Administrative Law §2.07, at 101-104 (1958). 
11 This requirement can be applicable to only a suit filed in an "inferior federal 
court~" · 
12 The statute also specifies the court in which the attorney general must 
commence his initial action; alternative courts, should that aetion fail; what 
course to follow should the second proceeding in the inferior court also fail; and 
whom to name as party plaintiff in all actions. 
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is somewhat irregular for it to do so with such particularity. Whether 
these restrictions of Chapter 174 on what would ordinarily be dis-
cretionary and tactical decisions of the attorney general amount 
to a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers is questionable.l3 
Most probably they do not. That question exists, however, and consti-
tutes one more obstacle on an already perilous road to constitution-
ality. 
§12.5. Chapter 174 litigation. The aspect of Chapter 174 of the 
Acts of 1970 which the popular media have represented most inac-
curately to date is the relationship between the statute and the Viet-
nam War litigation commenced under its mandate. It has been rather 
uniformly reported that that litigation has involved "the constitution-
ality of a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the participation of Massa-
chusetts inhabitants in the Vietnam War."1 Such a characterization is 
not now and has never been accurate. 
We have seen earlier that Section 1 of the statute creates no new 
rights, but instead refers to existing rights provided by the Constitu-
tion of the United States. As a result, all Chapter 174 court tests of the 
Vietnam War, along with all other such tests,2 have been based upon 
those provisions of the Constitution and not upon any statutory 
reference to them.3 We have also seen that Section 2 of the Shea Act 
13 At the heart of the doctrine of separation of powers is the belief that a co-
ordinate branch of government should be free to exercise authority in areas 
where it has particular expertise. The validity of that belief is amply demonstrated 
by the sentence of Section 2 now in question. The legislature, in requiring that 
all persons giving notice be joined as parties, was presumably unaware that in 
many instances this would be jurisdictionally impossible or impracticable. Just 
as an individual cannot be joined in an original action in the Supreme Court, so 
too a person who has refused to obey an order to Vietnam cannot be joined as 
plaintiff in an action on behalf of one who has obeyed such an order. A person 
refusing orders would most likely raise his constitutional argument in a habeas 
corpus proceeding, while a person obeying orders would bring an equity suit 
for declaratory and injunctive relief. Another problem with the mandatory 
joinder provisions of Section 2 is the practical burden it imposes upon the Depart-
ment of the Attorney General. If 200 Massachusetts inhabitants give notice under 
Chapter 174, the attorney general might spend his next few months preparing 
the service of process andfor the complaint. For every serviceman joined as a 
plaintiff, the military chain of command ordering him to Vietnam would also 
have to be joined as a defendant. For the potential Massachusetts constitutional 
complications in such restrictions, see 2 Mass. Op. Atty. Gen. 405, 406-407 (1903). 
§12.5. 1 The most obvious error in such a characterization is the fact that 
Chapter 174 does not mention by name, and presumably is not limited to, the 
Vietnam War. 
2 A partial, yet representative, listing of such tests includes: Luftig v. McNa-
mara, 373 F .2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Velvel v. 
Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 236 (lOth Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1969); Mattola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970); 
Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 
1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
3 The briefs in Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), are perhaps the best 
evidence of this fact. Chapter 174 is infrequently mentioned, let alone discussed, 
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cannot be the basis of Massachusetts' standing to question the con-
stitutionality of the Vietnam War. Again, as a result, in all Chapter 
17 4 litigation the attorney general has argued that Massachusetts 
is a proper party in interest because it has been harmed as a sovereign 
state by the Vietnam War, and not because it has passed Chapter 174.4 
The only possible necessary relationship between the Massachusetts 
statute and its resulting litigation arises out of another section of the 
Massachusetts General Laws. Chapter 12, Section 3, provides that: 
The attorney general shall appear for the commonwealth . . . 
in all suits .•. in which the commonwealth is a party . , . in all 
courts of the commonwealth ... and in such suits ... before any 
other tribunal ... when requested by the governor or by the 
general court or either branch thereof. [Emphasis added.] 
If this is interpreted to mean that the attorney general may appear 
before "any other tribunal," including all federal courts, only when 
directed or requested to by the legislature or governor, then the Shea 
Act is unquestionably essential to the litigation brought under its 
mandate. Whether the foregoing is a necessary reading of this statute, 
however, is open to dispute. 
It is clear that the attorney general has common law power to initi-
ate suit when and wherever necessary to protect the public in-
terest of the Commonwealth.5 While the limits of this power are 
uncertain, it is not unreasonable to expect that they are broad enough 
to authorize the type of action contemplated by the proponents of 
Chapter 174. If this is so, a legislative directive to commence the same 
litigation was and is unnecessary. 
In sum, there is small likelihood that Chapter 174 is essential to 
the Vietnam litigation most people believe to have been commenced 
to sustain that very statute's constitutionality. In fact, there is the very 
real possibility that it matters not whether Chapter 174 is unconstitu-
tional, since it may be unnecessary. 
§12.6. Conclusion. The constitutional hurdles which the Shea Act 
must overcome are substantial, due in large measure to poor legisla-
tive draftsmanship. The picture is not entirely bleak, however, as 
by all parties to the action, and then only as part of the statement of facts. Sec 
also the briefs for all parties and the opinion of the court in Orlando v. Laird, 
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), and Berk v. Laird, 317 1'. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 
1970), where the analogous statutory basis for suit, Section 5 of th.e Civil Rights 
Law of New York, was neither argued by the parties nor relied upon by the 
court in the constitutional analysis of the Vietnam War. 
4 See Brief for Plaintiff at 9-14, Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970). 
5 Commonwealth v. Kozlowsky, 238 Mass. 379, 385-386, 390-391, 131 N.E. 207, 
210 (1921). See also Jacobson v. Parks & Recreation Commn. of Boston, 345 Mass. 
641, 644, 189 N.E.2d 199, 202 (1963); Attorney General v. Trustees of Boston Ele-
vated Ry., 319 Mass. 642, 652-653, 67 N.E.2d 676, 685 (1946); Dube v. Mayor of Fall 
River, 308 Mass. 12, 15, 30 N.E.2d 817, 818-819 (1941); Goddard v. Smithett-, 69 
Mass. 116, 122-125 (1854); Parker v. May, 59 Mass. 336, 337-340 (1850). 
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constitutional constructions of both sections of the statute exist ana 
could be adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court.l That Court has 
narrowed comparably general language in the past2 and may very 
well do so again. On balance, however, it appears safe to speculate 
that the historical importance of Chapter 174 of the Massachusetts 
Acts of 1970 will be political rather than legal. 
§12.6. 1 The Supreme Judicial Court, as the highest court of the Commonwealth, 
has the responsibility to definitively construe Chapter 174. Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. 
Thibodaux City, 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959). This is true whether the constitution-
ality of the statute is put in issue in a state . or federal court. England v. 
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). 
2 Compare the general language of G.L., c. 272, §§ 20-21A, with the interpreta-
tion given them in Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 748-749, 247 N.E.2d 
574, 576 (1969). 
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